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The evidential problem of evil has become an important topic within the philosophy of 
religion. This formulation of the problem of evil states that it is unlikely that God exists given the 
existence of pointless suffering. In response, many theists have taken a position known as 
skeptical theism, which argues that one cannot make any reasonable judgments about such cases 
of suffering, as humans are not omniscient and therefore cannot know whether there may  be 
goods attached that could justify the inherent evil of the suffering. This paper argues that 
skeptical theism as a response to the evidential problem of evil undermines the rest of theism, as 
it forces skepticism about all other tenets of religious faith. In addition, this paper argues that 
skeptical theism makes any relationship with the divine, a core tenant of most theistic religions, 
impossible. Given these reasons, skeptical theism is not a logical standpoint for the theist to take, 
as it cannot pose a compelling response to the problem of evil without quickly leading to a level 
of skepticism that undercuts theism. 
Rowe’s Formulation of the Evidential Problem of Evil and the Response of Skeptical 
Theism 
  In his 1996 essay entitled “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 
William Rowe gives his formulation of the evidential problem of evil as follows:  
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.  
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.  
3. There does not exist an omnipotent,  omniscient, wholly good being.1  
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Rowe’s argument forms around the existence of pointless suffering.  Pointless suffering is 
suffering that an omniscient, omnipotent being could prevent without a) losing a good so great 
that the world would be worse off without it, or b) causing an equally bad or greater evil to exist. 
Most would agree that (2) is accurate and God would do anything possible to prevent instances 
of suffering unless his intervention would lead to the forfeiture of some greater good or the 
imposition of some greater evil. In addition, most would agree that the conclusion follows if both 
(1) and (2) turn out to be true. Given the aforementioned case, it seems as though Rowe only 
needs to prove that cases of pointless suffering do exist in order to logically conclude that it is at 
the least very unlikely that God exists.  
  In an effort to claim that (1) is correct and cases of pointless suffering exist, Rowe 
describes a fawn trapped in a forest fire. The fawn is unable to escape, leading to it burning 
horribly and finally dying several days later. Rowe argues that this is a clear case of pointless 
suffering, as it seems impossible that there could be any greater goods attached to or any evils 
prevented by such a case. Clearly, an omnipotent, omniscient being would have been well aware 
of the fawn’s suffering and could have either prevented it in the first place or ensured its timely 
end. Rowe admits that such a case may not prove conclusively that (1) is true, but it does give 
good reason to believe that cases of pointless suffering, even if there are only a few,  do occur.2  
  In response to Rowe’s formulation of the evidential problem of evil, many philosophers 
moved to the position that has become known as skeptical theism. Their claim was that humans 
do not have any good reason to believe that one would be able to see any of the goods that could 
potentially be related to instances of seemingly pointless suffering. One of these philosophers 
was Michael Bergmann, who lays out three skeptical theses in his article entitled “Skeptical 
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Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil.” Bergmann believes these theses form 
the core of the skeptical theist’s view. While all three factor into his discussion of skeptical 
theism, most of his argument defends the first thesis. He states this as “ST1: We have no good 
reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods 
there are.”3 Essentially, Bergmann argues here that one cannot make any reasonable judgements 
about cases of seemingly pointless suffering, as whether or not there may be goods associated 
with such cases cannot be definitively known.  
  Much of Bergmann’s argument rests on the idea that humans are not omniscient and 
therefore cannot know if there are any goods that have a direct link to cases of seemingly 
pointless suffering.4 Bergmann is correct. It is possible that an omniscient God, should he exist, 
could know of goods that are beyond human knowledge. However, it is severely detrimental to 
theism as a whole for one to argue for this view.   
Arguments against Skeptical Theism 
  An argument in response to Bergmann and the rest of skeptical theism in general is as 
follows:  
1. If one accepts skeptical theism (ST), then one accepts the idea that one cannot 
make reasonable judgements about what God would do in any given situation, 
as humans are not omniscient.  
2. If one cannot make reasonable judgments about what God would do in any 
given situation, then one cannot know if any of the other tenets of religious 
faith are true (e.g. that God created humans in his image or the idea that there 
is an afterlife).  
3. Therefore, if one accepts ST, then one must remain skeptical about all other 
aspects of religious faith.  
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Skeptical theism clearly opens the door to a much more expansive version of skepticism 
than it ever intended. If one accepts that God is omniscient and therefore capable of bringing 
about certain goods that are beyond human knowledge, then one must accept that humans can 
make no reasonable judgments about what God would do in any given situation. Given this, one 
has no plausible reason to believe that any other tenets of religious faith are accurate. For 
example, if one cannot know how God would act in any given situation, then one cannot know 
whether or not God created humans in his image. It may have been the case that by God not 
creating humans in his image and instead creating humans in an entirely different way, he 
brought about goods outside of human knowledge. The same can then be said of all other aspects 
of religious faith, which seem to undermine theism in a very substantial way.  
One of the most crucial tenets of theistic faith is the idea that one must form a personal 
and loving relationship with the divine. Accepting ST renders this impossible. An argument for 
this is as follows:  
1. If one accepts ST, then one cannot know the reasons behind any of the things 
that God allows or does himself.  
2. Truly loving relationships seem to be impossible when one party does not 
know the morality behind the other party’s actions, particularly when those 
actions directly lead to harm or suffering for the first party.  
3. Therefore, if one accepts ST, then one cannot have a truly loving relationship 
with God.  
 
The argument here is very similar to that of Richard Gale in his paper “Some Difficulties 
in Theistic Treatments of Evil.” Gale argues that, “while we need not understand all of the 
beloved’s moral reasons for her behavior, it must be the case that, for the most part, we do in 
respect to behavior which vitally affects ourselves.”5 It seems to be the case that humans are 
unable to understand God’s motivations or what goods he is possibly bringing about for a large 
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amount of the evil in the world; thus, it is unlikely that humans could ever form a trusting and 
loving relationship with the divine. As Gale argues, such a relationship would be possible if and 
only if humans knew the reasoning behind most of the suffering in the world.  However, as this is 
not the case, it seems like any relationship with the divine defined as truly loving is simply 
impossible.6  
Objections in Favor of Skeptical Theism 
  It seems clear that the first response the skeptical theist will offer here is that ST is not 
detrimental to theism as a whole, as the theistic God is not a deceiver. This argument would most 
likely have the following organization:  
1. If God exists, then he is a perfect being.  
2. If he is a perfect being, then he cannot intentionally deceive humanity.  
3. Humans know all other tenets of religious faith through God.  
4. Because God cannot deceive humans, one can know that these other tenets are 
true.  
5. Therefore, all other tenets of religious faith are true.  
 
This argument states that a perfect god, such as the standard conception of the theistic God, 
would be incapable of lying to humanity, as lying is generally morally impermissible. As certain 
religions tell humans that all other tenets of theism are handed down by God directly and God is 
incapable of deception, it seems to logically follow that all other tenets are true. If so, skeptical 
theism poses no serious threat to the rest of theism.  
In response to the second consideration—that ST makes a truly loving relationship with 
the divine impossible—the theist will here point to the fact that humans consistently form truly 
loving relationships with others, even considering one cannot ever truly know another’s motives 
or the impacts of those motives. Yet, humans believe that entering into such relationships is 
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logical. The theist will argue that it is therefore completely reasonable to enter into a loving 
relationship with the divine.  
Response to the Objections in Favor of Skeptical Theism 
  While the theist’s response regarding God’s perfection is worthwhile, it ultimately fails. 
If one uses the standard theistic parent-child analogy here, it becomes clear that God could in 
fact be capable of deceiving humans.    
It seems to be the case that there are certain situations that more or less justify parents 
deceiving their children in an effort to secure long-term benefits that may be unavailable 
otherwise. One example of this may be with adopted children. Many parents of adopted children 
choose to wait until their child is at a relatively mature age before revealing to them that they are 
not their biological parents. Others may even choose to withhold the truth completely. Most 
people would agree that such deceptions are not ideal but are also not nonsensical and are easily 
justifiable as the parents are simply trying to do what is best for the child in the long run.  
If one then applies this to God, it seems clear that there could be scenarios where God 
would deceive humans regarding certain theological truths in an effort to gain long-term benefits 
that would otherwise be unachievable. This becomes even more plausible if one accepts the 
skeptical theist’s argument and says that it is possible there exist goods beyond human 
knowledge. If such a good is possible and if such a good were so great that the world would be 
substantially worse off without it, then it seems clear that God would be justified in deceiving 
humans  in order to obtain it.  
  This idea of God’s deception even seems to have theistic backing in some cases. Certain 
sects of Christianity and Islam believe that their religions are necessary, as God believed 
humanity was not ready for full revelation before their formulation. As God believed humanity 
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was not yet ready to receive his full word, these sects believe that deceiving humanity until the 
time came when humanity was ready was justifiable.  
  William Rowe offers another argument about how skeptical theism leads to a more 
substantial form of skepticism that can be adapted to form a second argument as to why God 
would be capable of deceiving humanity. Many sects in Christianity hold a belief that God first 
created all of the angels as near-perfect beings. Eventually, Satan and his cohorts revolted, and 
God sentenced them to eternal damnation. Rowe argues that, given the near-perfection of these 
fallen angels and humanity’s lack of perfection, if one accepts skeptical theism, then one cannot 
know whether or not it could be the case that God would choose to sacrifice humanity in order to 
secure the salvation of Satan and his comrades.7  
  If one alters this slightly one can say that, if one accepts skeptical theism, then one is 
unable to make any reasonable judgments as to whether or not there could be circumstances in 
which God would be justified in deceiving humanity for the sake of a greater good. More 
importantly, if one accepts skeptical theism, then one is also committed to the idea that there 
could be certain circumstances in which God would be morally obligated to deceive humanity 
about certain theological truths in order to obtain a good so great the universe would be worse 
off without it. It seems clear that accepting skeptical theism also leaves the door open to the 
possibility of God deceiving humanity in a morally justifiable way. Therefore, proponents of 
skeptical theism must remain skeptical about all other aspects of religious faith, including those 
tenets that God reportedly handed down directly.  
  The theistic response that a relationship with the divine is still possible also fails when 
one considers it a bit more closely. While it is true that humans do form truly loving relationships 
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with others even though others possess the capability to lie, it seems to be the case that one only 
forms such relationships with those one trusts. In order for humans to move from simply being 
close with each other to this higher level, it seems to be the case that mutual trust, respect, and 
benevolence must first be established. As the motivations behind much of what God seems to 
allow in the world remain unseen, it appears to be the case that forming such a foundation is 
impossible, as the goods he may or may not be bringing about are beyond human knowledge. 
This again demonstrates that skeptical theism and its inherent skepticism towards the divine 
means that humans cannot form a truly loving and personal relationship with any deity when that 
deity’s motives are unknown.  
Conclusion 
  In sum, it is clear that skeptical theism fails as a response to Rowe’s formulation of the 
evidential problem from evil. While it certainly does pose certain issues for the problem of evil, 
it is clear that its inherent skepticism can also be used to attack the rest of theism in general. In 
addition, it seems to be the case that skeptical theism makes the prospect of forming a personal 
and loving relationship with the divine impossible. As this is central to almost all theistic 
religions, this is clearly a major area where skeptical theism unintentionally undercuts its own 
argument. While none of this conclusively proves that God does not exist, it does seem as if the 
evidential problem still poses a serious threat to theism and must be taken into further 
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